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GIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
Habeas Corpus in Extradition Proceedings Involving Escaped Convicts
In Johnson v. Dye,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit freed a convicted murderer, held for extradition in Pennsylvania,
on the ground that while serving his sentence in Georgia, he had been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Thus the Court of Appeals sought
to enforce its conclusion that, like those principles of the First and
Fourth Amendments also included in the concept of due process,3 that
principle of the Eighth Amendment4 which forbids cruel and unusual
punishment by the federal government is "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'' 5 The
Supreme Court, however, has postponed divulging its opinion on this
Constitutional question by curtly reversing the Court of Appeals on the
procedural ground of failure to exhaust state remedies. 6 Nevertheless, it
is very likely that some day the Supreme Court will have to determine
the status of cruel and unusual punishments in relation to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Habeas corpus petitions on this ground are numerous, and
already a district court has freed an Alabama fugitive on the authority
of the Court of Appeals decision in the Johnson case.
7
The Johnson case arose upon a petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner
Johnson had been convicted of murder by a Georgia court, and sentenced
to life imprisonment in 1943. He escaped from a chain gang a few
months later and came to Pennsylvania, where he was arrested upon
demand by the Governor of Georgia for his extradition. While in the
Allegheny County jail, Johnson petitioned the Court of Common Pleas
for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was discharged and judgment
affirmed on appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.8 Johnson
sought no further review, but petitioned the Federal District Court for
a writ of habeas corpus9 asserting inter alia that following his conviction
he was "committed to a chain-gang... and was the victim of cruel, bar-
baric and inhuman treatment at the hands of his jailors to the extent
that his life and health were in grave jeopardy."10 The District Court
1175 F. (2d) 250 (C.A. 3d 1949).
2 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV §1: 11... nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law..."
3 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)
(freedom of speech and assembly); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)(freedom of press); Hamilton v.
Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(freedom of religion); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (freedom from un-
reasonable search and seizure).
4U.S. Const. Amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
5 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
6 18 U.S. Law Week, 3148 (1949) ; See text at note 19, infra.
7 Harper v. Wall, 85 P. Supp. 783 (D.C. N.J..1949).
8 Commonwealth ez rel. Johnson v. Dye, 159 Pa. Super. 542, 49 A: (2d) 195 (1946).
9 Johnson v. Dye, 71 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
.10 Johnson's petition, Johnson v. Dye, 175 P. (2d) 250, 252 (C.A. 3d 1949).
Johnson also alleged that his constitutional rights had been violated at his trial for
murder in Georgia in that several witnesses who testified against him did so under
police compulsion, and that, if returned to Georgia, he feared death by mob violence
or at the hands of his jailors. The District Court found no evidence to support the
former allegation (a finding criticized by the Court of Appeals since there had been
Johnson's testimony in support of the allegation), and it found no credible evidence
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found evidence that Johnson had received cruel treatment after his con-
viction and while he was serving his sentence, but concluded that such
treatment would not entitle him to his liberty as it did not constitute a
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,"
and that the Eighth Amendment was not a limitation upon the states.
12
Without considering the other issues raised by the petition, the majority
in the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and freed Johnson
on the ground that he had. been subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment while on the chain-gang. The Court of Appeals entertained "no
doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment by a state,"' I s citing Francis v. Resweber.14
The Court of Appeals seems to indicate that it considers any punish-
ment which would violate the Eighth Amendment when inflicted by the
federal government a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when in-
flitted by a state. On the contrary, the three opinions written in Francis
v. Resweber contain language from which it would follow that the
Supreige Court has not committed itself to that position,15 but rather
to support the latter allegation. The Court of Appeals did not resolve the questions
raised by these two allegations.
11 Citing Rev. Stat. §1741 (1908), the relevant part of which provided: "The writ
of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail unless where he is in
custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or is committed for
trial before some court thereof; or is in custody for an act done or omitted in
pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court
or judge thereof; or is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or
treaty of the United States . . ." This provision was repealed and substantially
repassed in 1948. See new Judicial Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.
Code Cong. Serv. (June 25, 1948) §2241.
12 Citing Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 510-511 (1915).
13 Johnson v. Dye, 175 F. (2d) 250, 255 (C.A. 3d 1949).
14 329 U.S. 459 (1947). There the petitioner, sentenced to execution for murder,
was placed in the electric chair and the switch thrown. Due to a mechanical defect
in the chair, he did not die. It was bncertain whether he had received any electrical
shock at all. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court decided that it would
not violate any provision of the Constitution to put the petitioner in the electric
chair again and carry out the sentence.
15 Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for himself and three other justices, said in
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947): "To determine whether or not the
execution of the petitioner may fairly take place after the experience through which
he passed, we shall examine the circumstances under the assumption, but without
so deciding, that violation of the principles of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments,
as to double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment, would be violative of the"
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." As a positive indication that
the Court intends to consider each cruel and unusual punishment individually in
the light of due process, Mr. Justice Reed said at page 463: "The Fourteenth
would prohibit by its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner."
Mr. Justice Frahkfurter, concurring, said at pages 469 and 470: "Again, a state
may be found to deny a person due process by treating even one guilty of crime
in a manner that violates standards of decency more or less universally accepted
though not when it treats him by a mode about which opinion is fairly divided.
But the penological policy of a state is not to be tested by the -scope of the Eighth
Amendment and is not involved in the controversy which -is necessarily evoked by
that Amendment as to the historic meaning of 'cruel and unusual punishment.' "
Mr. Justice Burton, speaking for the four dissenting justices, said at page 477:
"In determining whether a case of cruel and unusual punishment constitutes a
violation of due process of law, each case must turn upon its particular facts."
It should, however, be here noted that three of the justices who concurred in the
dissent, and one who concurred with the majority have since stated their view to
be that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the first eight amend-
.ments applicable to the states. Black, J., dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 68, 123 (1947).
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that it means to treat cruel and unusual punishment as it has treated
double jeopardy in Palko v. Connecticut.6 That is, punishment which
would be cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment might
or might not be unconstitutional when subjected to the test of due process.
On this basis, the bare finding by the Court of Appeals that Johnson
received cruel and unusual punishment would not alone support the- con-
clusion that the state of Georgia deprived Johnson of due process of
law. Rather, an examination of the specific indignities inflicted upon
Johnson would be required, 17 and a finding that they were irreconcilable
with those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions" would be necessary.' 8
Conceding, however, that some cruel and unusual punishment at least
is banned by the Fourteenth Amendment, and assuming that the punish-
ment inflicted upon Johnson was of such a nature, the serious question of
remedy arises in two aspects: first, the issue on which the Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals, whether Johnson properly directed his
petition for habeas corpus to the federal courts before having exhausted,
state remedies, -and, second, whether in an extradition proceeding habeas
corpus is a proper remedy where the prisoner is claiming that he has
been denied due process in the demanding state.
The Supreme Court did not comment in reversing the Court of Appeals
except to cite Ex parte Hawk.19 This ruling must be taken to mean that
in extradition eases the federal courts will not grant habeas corpus until
state remedies are exhausted. The Court of Appeals had sought to avoid
the mandate of Ex parte Hawk on the theory that the doctrine of ex-
haustion of state remedies in habeas corpus eases does not apply to
extradition proceedings because the fugitive is held under color of au-
thority derived from the Constitution and laws of the United State
2 0
16 302 U.S. 319 (1937). By the law of Connecticut, the state could appeal the
decision in a criminal case, and, if successful, retry the defendant. Although this
procedure was forbidden to the Federal government by-the "double jeopardy"
clause of the Fifth Amendment, it was held to be permissible when practiced by a
state. The Court indicated, however, that some other kinds of double jeopardy may
be forbidden to the states by the Federal Constitution.
17The Court of Appeals, having concluded, apparently, that the punishments
prohibited by a cruel and unusual punishment clause are conterminous with those
prohibited by a due process clause, noted only that leg-irons land most frequent
beatings were among the minor constant cruelties. Not so long ago in some states,
a sentence of whipping was held not to violate a constitutional provision against
cruel and unusual punishment. Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694 (Va. 1828);
Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264 (1883). In view of this history, query whether a pro-
hibition against beating is a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." See note 5 supra.
18 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 328 (19S7).
'9321 U. S. 114 (1944). At page 116, the Court there said, "Ordinarily an appli-
cation for habeas corpus by one detained under a state court judgment of conviction
for crime will be entertained by a federal court only after.all the state remedies
available, including all appellate remedies in the state courts and [in the United
States Supreme Court] by appeal or writ of eertiorari, have been exhausted. ' It
should be noted that the rule has recently been liberalized to preclude the absolute
necessity of petition to the United States Supreme Court after the highest state
court has rendered a decision on the merits. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672 (1948).
2o U. S. Const. Art. IV, §2, clause 2: "A person charged in any State with trea-
son, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another
State, shall, on demand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled,
be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." The
constitutional provision is executed by statute. See new Criminal Code, Crimes and
Criminal Procedure, 18 U. S. Code Cong. Serv. (June 25, 1948) §3182.
[Vol. 40
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Whether or not to apply the rule under these circumstances had given
rise to a split of authority in the federal courts.21 The split, however, was
not based on disagreement as to the power of the federal courts to grant
habeas corpus to any prisoner held in violation of his constitutional
rights. The power is given by statute.22 Rather, the consideration is one
of comity between the federal and state governments. It reflects a reluc-
tance on the part of the federal courts to interfere with state processes
before a prisoner has attempted to utilize all the remedies afforded to
him by the state.
23
The reason for the rule requiring exhaustion of state remedies would
seem to be as cogent in extradition proceedings as in any other habeas
corpus cases. Conceding that both the authority and the mandate to
extradite fugitives from one state to another flow from the Constitution
and laws of the United States,2 4 nevertheless the extradition process itself
depends completely upon state initiative and state action. The federal
government cannot enforce the Constitutional mandate; hence the duty
of a state to extradite a fugitive is a moral one only, resting entirely "on
the fidelity of the State Executive to the compact entered into with the
other states ... "25 The fugitive, moreover, is held in state rather than
federal custody, and the courts of the state clearly have jurisdiction over
the prisoner if he seeks their aid. All things considered, the holding of a
fugitive for extradition bears so many of the characteristics of a holding
under color of state rather than federal authority that the exhaustion
rule would seem to be applicable. Since it is, however, only a rule of
comity, it could still be waived by the federal courts under the same
circumstances that they will waive it in any case, i.e., "whenever neces-
sary to prevent an unjust and illegal deprivation of human liberty."1
2 6
The second aspect of the remedy problem involves the propriety of the
consideration by any court in an asylum state of due process questions
in a habeas corpus proceeding.. The dissenting judge in the Court of
Appeals demonstrated his position with respect to this issue by supposing
the case of two prisoners, X and Y, denied due process at their trial.
After conviction, X escapes from prison in the jurisdiction in which he
was convicted. On the authority of the Court of Appeals opinion in
Johnson v. Dye, a court in an asylum state where X was apprehended
would seem to be justified in freeing X unconditionally because he had
been denied a fundamental constitutional right. Y, on the other hand,
appeals in the state where he was convicted and obtains a reversal of the
conviction. Y must then stand trial again. Clearly the result is incon-
gruous and would seem to place a premium on jailbreaking. Moreover,
to give the escaped prisoner a due process hearing in.the asylum state
21 Compare Kauffman v. Mount, 131 F. (2d) 112 (C. A. 5th 1942) and Lyon v.
Harkness, 151 F. (2d) 731 (C. A. 1st 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 782 (1946), with
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80 (1885), Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909); Ex
parte Dawson, 83 Fed. 306 (C. A. 8th 1897), cert. denied, 170 U.S. 705 (1898), and
U.S. ex rel. Darcy v. Superintendent of County Prisons, 111 F. (-2d) 409, (C. A. 3d
1940), cert denied, 311 U.S. 662 (1940). In the latter cases the federal court in each
instance heard the petition on the merits with no specific consideration of the doctrine
of exhaustion of state remedies.
22 New Judicial Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. Code Cong. Serv.
(June 25, 1948) §2241.
23 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672 (1948).
24 See note 20 supra.
25 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 109 (1861).
26 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 681 (1948).
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presents the practical difficulty of marshaling evidence since the question
would be adjudicated in a forum far removed from the scene of the
events.27 Add to the hypothetical case, however, the probability that
upon retrial the defendants would again be deprived of their constitu-
tional rights, and the dissenting judge would grant the propriety of inter-
vention by a foreign court.
The facts of Johnson v. Dye present a slightly varied problem. The
cruel and unusual punishment suffered by Johnson resulted not from an
erroneous trial court judgment which a new trial could correct, but from
unlawful acts of state penal officers subsequent to trial. Just as the dis-
senting judge would not intervene in the former case unless it were
shown that the error would not be corrected upon retrial, so he would not
interfere in the latter unless it appeared that Johnson would suffer
further cruel and unusual punishment upon his return to Georgia.
The propriety of intervention in the latter case ought, perhaps, to
depend not only on the likelihood that Johnson would again be subjected
to cruel and unusual punishment, but also on the seriousness of the
bodily harm hie might suffer and the availability to him of preventive
remedies in Georgia. If it should appear, first, that the treatment await-
ing Johnson were not such as to place him in imminent danger of serious
or permanent bodily harm, and secondly, that the Georgia prison officials
would not deprive him of access to the courts, then it would seem he
might properly be returned to Georgia to seek his remedy.
The circumstances appear to present a proper case for use of the
federal court injunction against the prison authorities. The Civil Rights
Act specifically provides for suits in equity in federal district courts
against persons acting under color of state law.28 That exercise of this
equity jurisdiction is justified would seem to follow from the fact that
maltreatment of Johnson was repeated, and, if continued, could result
in irreparable injury. In Hague v. Committee for. Industrial Organiza-
27 At Johnson's hearing in Pennsylvania, all of Johnson's witnesses except one
were escaped convicts from Georgia who happened to be lodged in the Allegheny
County jail. The remaining witness was a former officer in the Army who had spent
a portion of his service in Georgia and who was then confined in the Allegheny
County jail. None of these could testify as to the punishment actually inflicted upon
Johnson, but only as to the treatmnent of chain-gang prisoners in general.
28 Rev. Stat. §7905 (1908), 8 USCA §43 (1942): "Civil action for deprivation of
rights. Every person who, under color of any statte, ordinance,, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to he subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress." The new Judicial Code, Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure, 28 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. (June 25, 1948) §1343, gives jurisdiction over
such suits to the federal district courts.
While an action for damages could be maintained under the statute against the
prison guards, they are likely to be judgment proof. Moreover the threat of jail for
violation of an injunction would be more of a deterrent to futurg maltreatment.
The new Criminal Code, Crimes and Criminal P'rocedure, 18 U. S. Code Cong. Serv.
(June 25, 1943) §242 provides criminal penalties for anyone who, "under color of
any law . . or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States . . . " Tha difficulty in prosecuting the prison guards
under this provision would probably stem from the decision in Screws v. United
States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945) where the Court said that in order to convict, the jury
must find that the defendants had the purpose to deprive the prisoner of a consti-
tutional right, and the right of which the defendants intend to deprive the prisoner
[Vol 40
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tion,29 the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to enjoin the
deprivation by state officers of the right to freedom of speech and freedom
of assembly. If the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment is
now to be valid as against the states, then it should merit equally effec-
tive enforcement. By resort to these considerations, rather than auto-
matically granting habeas corpus in circumstances like those presented
by Johnson v. Dye, the courts could strike a more satisfactory balance
between "the social need that crime shall be repressed," on the one side,
and "on the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the
insolence of office. "80
KENNETH LE;VI
must be one which has been made specific by the express terms of the Constitution
or laws of the United States or decisions interpreting them. Since the Supreme
Court has not yet said that the Constitution enjoins the States from imposing such
cruel and unusual punishment as was inflicted on Johnson, that offense would not
yet be sufficiently specific on which to base a criminal prosecution.
The predecessor to this new criminal provision, 35 Stat. 1692 (1909) to similar
effect, wa's rarely used before 1940. Since then it has been invoked several times. Of.
Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1941) ; Crews v. United States, 160 F. (2d) 746 (C. A. 5th 1947) ; Pullen v. United
States, 164 F. (2d) 756 (C. A. 5th 1947).
29 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
50 Cardozo, J., in People v. DeFore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24-25, 150 N. E. 585, 589 (1926).
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Bingo with Payoff in Merchandise Is Gambling-In the course of
passing on the validity of a license revocation by the City of East
Detroit, the Michigan Supreme Court held that under the statute
which prohibits any lottery or gift enterprise and the disposition of
any property by it, bingo games paying off in merchandise were gam-
bling. In the instant case concessionaires operating the game in the
plaintiff's amusement park paid two hundred dollars a week to the
plaintiff and a similar amount to a local charity for the use of its name
as sponsor. The plaintiff alleged that charitable and other non-profit
organizations were permitted to conduct bingo games with impunity.
Even so, said the court, that fact does not legalize the playing of bingo
which comes within the terms of the statute.
Although the offense of gambling is strictly statutory and its scope
dependent upon the terminology employed in the particular statute,
this case does give some support to attempts to include bingo within the
ban, particularly where the statute is drafted to cover the disposition
of real or personal property by lottery. In any event, it stands as
precedent for the opinion that bingo is a lottery or gift enterprise.
(Eastwood Park Amusement Company v. Stark, 38 N. W. (2d) 77
(Mich., 1949).)
19491
